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I.

INTRODUCTION

When Minnesota engaged in the great reform and
recodification effort that led to the Criminal Code of 1963, it was
part of a nationwide reform movement. That movement was
spurred in large part by the American Law Institute and its Model
Penal Code. The Minnesota drafters were influenced by the MPC
and, at least in some areas, adopted MPC recommendations.
The MPC’s most significant innovation was in the law of mens
rea—the body of law concerning the mental state or “guilty mind”
necessary for criminal liability. The MPC drafters recognized that
the common law of mens rea was fundamentally incoherent and
had been a constant source of confusion for courts. The MPC
drafters therefore created a bold new mens rea framework.
†
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Minnesota, however, did not adopt that framework. Instead, the
drafters of the 1963 Code attempted smaller changes, and since
then, Minnesota courts have continued to rely heavily on the
common law of mens rea. As a result, the same mens rea problems
that befuddled old common law courts linger in Minnesota today.
These problems cause needless confusion and unpredictability in
the criminal law. It is time for Minnesota to enact further reforms
to move the code closer to the MPC mens rea framework.
II. MENS REA UNDER THE MPC AND THE MINNESOTA
CRIMINAL CODE
A.

The Creation of the MPC

The early and mid-twentieth century was the heyday of the
American Law Institute, which led a broad movement to reform
and rationalize the law. From the 1920s to the 1940s, the ALI
produced enormously influential Restatements in several areas of
law.
In the early 1950s, the ALI turned its attention to the criminal
law. The ALI determined that the criminal law in America was
fractured and inconsistent, with a great deal of jurisdictional
variation, and also that American criminal law was sometimes
1
senseless. It determined that a Restatement of Criminal Law was
neither possible nor wise. The ALI therefore set out to produce a
model criminal code instead. Indeed, its lofty goal was to produce
2
an “ideal penal code.” A dozen years of study and drafting, led by
Chief Reporter Herbert Wechsler, led to the 1962 adoption of the
3
Model Penal Code.
The MPC was intended to stimulate legislative reform around
the country. The drafters’ goal was that state legislators would
adopt the provisions of the MPC, leading to a more uniform and
4
more sensible criminal law in the United States. To a substantial
extent, they succeeded. Many states adopted the MPC at least in
5
large part. And although its influence may have waned over the
1. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The
Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1425–26 (1968).
2. Herbert Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 525 (1955).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
4. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 1427.
5. See Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
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decades, the MPC remains a canonical source in criminal
6
jurisprudence. It still forms the basis of many states’ criminal
codes. It is still cited regularly by courts around the country. It is
still taught to most law students around the country and tested on
the bar exam. It has been widely praised by scholars: “The Code
itself was stunningly successful in accomplishing the comprehensive
rethinking of the criminal law that Wechsler and his colleagues
7
sought.”
The MPC was perhaps most influential in its approach to mens
rea—the mental state that a defendant must possess to be guilty of
8
a crime. For centuries, courts had said that mens rea was a
9
fundamental feature of the criminal law. “A critical facet of the
individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases
10
is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime.”
Indeed, the presence of a guilty mind (animo felonico) was said to be
the defining feature of criminal law—the thing that makes criminal
11
law different from other areas, such as tort law, the thing that
justifies sanctions including imprisonment and death rather than
12
mere monetary penalties. But the MPC drafters, building on the
13
work of early and mid-twentieth century legal scholars, recognized
(OFFICIAL DRAFT AND REVISED COMMENTS), at xi (1985).
6. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Tribute in Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1362, 1362 (2000) (“The MPC has since become the standard for discourse
concerning criminal law, both in academic analysis and in reform legislation.”).
7. Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1140 (1978).
8. Ronald L. Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 575, 575 (1988) (“The Code’s provisions concerning culpable mental
states introduced both reason and structure to a previously amorphous area of
Anglo-American law.”).
9. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21 (“So that to constitute a
crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and secondly, an
unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.”). For an overview of the
development of mens rea law in English legal history, see Paul H. Robinson, A Brief
History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 821–50 (1980).
10. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987).
11. A.K.R. KIRALFY, POTTER’S OUTLINES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 156, 158,
163–65 (5th ed. 1958).
12. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 20–28 (1968);
cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1923) (“[E]ven a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”).
13. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal
Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917); Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 905 (1939); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932);
Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 411–12 (1934); Glanville Williams, The Mental Element
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that the common law’s approach to mens rea was often confused,
unpredictable, and unprincipled.
American law has employed an abundance of mens rea
terms, such as general and specific intent, malice,
wilfulness, wantonness, recklessness, scienter, criminal
negligence, and the like—exhibiting what Mr. Justice
Jackson in a famous Supreme Court opinion called “the
variety, disparity and confusion” of “definitions of the
14
requisite but elusive mental element.”
They therefore proposed a bold and comprehensive new
framework for handling mens rea issues.
B.

The MPC’s Mens Rea Framework

The drafters of the MPC saw the common law mens rea
structure as fundamentally broken. Rather than try to fix it, they
started over.
Their new structure had several foundational
15
elements.
First, they created a new mens rea vocabulary. The common
16
law had developed dozens of different mens rea terms. Some of
these terms, such as “malice,” were vague and encrusted with
17
hundreds of years of confusing case law. Others, such as “general
intent,” had been used to mean different things at different times
18
in different jurisdictions.
The MPC thus abandoned the very
concept of “specific intent” and “general intent” in the criminal law
in Crime, 27 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 193 (1957).
14. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 1436 (quoting Morrissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952)).
15. For a general discussion and evaluation of the MPC’s mens rea
innovations, see Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983).
16. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability:
Mens Rea and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 125
(1980).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1 (1985). The
commentary to section 2.02 noted that studies had revealed seventy-six different
methods of describing mens rea in the federal criminal code alone. See id. § 2.02
n.3 (citing 1 Brown Commission Working Papers 119–20 (1970)).
18. See id. § 2.02 n.3 (describing the distinction between specific and general
intent as “an abiding source of confusion and ambiguity in the penal law”); see also
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (“This venerable distinction . . .
has been the source of a good deal of confusion.”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5, at 452–53 (2000) (describing at least three
different meanings of the phrase “specific intent” and at least four meanings of
“general intent” in the case law); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 142 (2d ed. 1960) (criticizing the distinction).
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based on the recognition that it had been “the source of endless
19
confusion in the courts.” In the view of the MPC drafters, the
mens rea vocabulary of the common law contained too many
options, not enough of which had a clear legal meaning.
They thus adopted a mens rea menu consisting of four
possible selections: purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, and
20
negligently. The list is hierarchical: each represents a different
21
level of culpability. Each has a fairly straightforward definition
that can be applied to different crimes and different contexts.
Thus, for any given criminal statute, a legislature may choose which
of the four levels of culpability is appropriate for the offense. Strict
22
liability is a fifth option, but a disfavored one. The MPC mens rea
vocabulary is clearer than the old common law vocabulary. It is
simpler than the old common law vocabulary. And yet at the same
time, it also provides legislatures with a broad spectrum of mens rea
options.
Second, the MPC drafters adopted the “elements approach” to
23
mens rea. Common law courts generally approached mens rea
questions on the assumption that each offense had some single mens
rea requirement. The MPC, by contrast, recognizes that each
element of a crime could have its own independent mens rea
requirement and thus that a single crime can have multiple mens
24
rea requirements.
The common law “offense” approach led to problems because
when a crime had multiple elements, there was no easy way to
determine where the mens rea attached. Consider an offense
prohibiting killing a bald eagle. Does the mens rea attach to the
act of killing or the fact that the victim is a bald eagle? One
defendant might intend to kill an animal but not know it is a bald
eagle; another defendant might know the animal in front of her is
a bald eagle but only kill it accidentally. Which is guilty? The
common law approach was generally to specify some single mens

19. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 215–16 (7th ed. 2001).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
21. For a criticism of the MPC’s hierarchical approach to mens rea, see
Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04(5) & cmt. 4.
23. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 693–96.
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (“[A] person is not guilty of an offense
unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may
require, with respect to each material element of the offense.” (emphasis added)).
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rea for the offense, but then (in some circumstances) allow
additional defenses for “mistakes.” For example, a defendant
might not be guilty of the bald eagle offense if she reasonably but
mistakenly believed that the bird she shot was a duck. But the
various mistake doctrines were confusing and inconsistently
applied.
Relatedly, the MPC drafters correctly recognized that mistake
doctrine was not truly distinguishable from mens rea doctrine but
was rather just a roundabout way of approaching mens rea for
25
certain elements. At common law, courts would occasionally state
that a crime had a single mens rea but then would also make
26
defenses available for “mistakes of fact.”
Thus, for the eagle
statute above, courts would sometimes treat the offense as having a
single mens rea (intentionally killing something), but then also say
that a defendant was not guilty if he was reasonably mistaken about
the type of bird. In short, courts sometimes treated mistake of fact
as “a separate and distinct issue notwithstanding its relation to the
27
State’s duty to prove a criminal intent.”
The MPC drafters recognized that mistake doctrine is not, in
fact, conceptually distinct from criminal intent.
Saying “a
defendant is not guilty if she made a reasonable mistake about the
type of bird” is no different from saying “a defendant is guilty if she
knew or should have known it was an eagle.” The MPC thus
28
abandoned mistake as an independent mens rea doctrine.
Instead, it simply recognized that offenses have multiple elements
and that each element might have a mens rea requirement
29
attached to it.
Thus, as to each element, the legislature can
choose the appropriate requirement by choosing from the fouritem mens rea menu.
Third, the MPC adopted default rules for filling in a mens rea
requirement when it is not clearly specified by the legislature. In
common law jurisdictions, courts often struggled to define what (if
any) mens rea requirement to adopt when the legislature failed to
speak clearly. They developed a variety of doctrines aimed at
25. Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (2003).
26. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6 (4th ed. 2003).
27. State v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 1978).
28. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04(1) & cmt. 1 (1985) (“In
other words, ignorance or mistake has only evidential import . . . .”).
29. Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact,
19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 545–47 (1988).
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specifying when a crime could be treated as a strict-liability offense,
and when mens rea would be read in. But those doctrines failed to
yield consistent results.
The MPC replaced that system with a mechanical default
presumption of statutory interpretation. Essentially, the default
30
rule is recklessness. If the legislature in an MPC jurisdiction fails
to specify a mens rea standard in an offense, then courts must
31
assume a requirement of recklessness as to each element.
Alternatively, if the legislature only specifies a mens rea
requirement for one element, then courts must apply that same
requirement to each element of the offense, unless a contrary
intention plainly appears. Of course, it remains the legislature’s
prerogative to specify whatever mens rea it chooses, or none at all,
for each element of the offense. But the MPC default rules solve
most of the problems that arise when the legislature fails to speak
clearly.
They also set a background presumption that the
legislature can choose to modify or not.
In those ways (and others), the MPC sought a major overhaul
of the law of mens rea. The MPC’s mens rea reforms were both
highly rational and also highly pragmatic. The MPC drafters’
influence on the law of mens rea has been enormous—their
contribution was “to bring thought and order to the resolution of
these questions and to dispel the obscurantist cloud that hung for
32
so long on the central mens rea issues in criminal law.” Though
certainly open to criticism in some respects, the MPC’s mens rea
framework was “a vast improvement over the previous disorder” of
33
the common law.
C.

Mens Rea in the Minnesota Criminal Code of 1963
34

Many states adopted the MPC’s mens rea framework, but
Minnesota did not. The Minnesota Criminal Code of 1963 was
drafted and enacted in the shadow of the MPC, and there is no
doubt that the Minnesota drafters were influenced by the MPC in
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962).
31. More specifically, when no mens rea is specified, a defendant is guilty if
he acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly as to that element. In other words, the
default rule is “recklessness or above.”
32. Kadish, supra note 7, at 1143.
33. Robinson, supra note 9, at 816.
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1, n.4 (1985)
(listing states that have adopted standards of culpability similar to MPC standards);
Robinson, supra note 9, at 815–16.
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35

many respects.
The drafters of the Minnesota Code adopted
portions of the MPC—for example, Minnesota adopted the basic
36
MPC definition of attempt liability.
Like the MPC drafters, the Minnesota drafters recognized that
the common law approach to mens rea was inconsistent and
confusing. Maynard Pirsig’s explanation for the code’s approach
to mens rea echoed the same criticisms of the common law voiced
by Herbert Wechsler and others.
To avoid present confusion, an attempt was also made to
state more clearly than do present statutes the particular
criminal intent or purpose required for each particular
crime. Terms in the present statutes such as “willful,”
“maliciously,” “knowingly,” and “wantonly” have produced
much confusion and uncertainty as to what mental state is
37
intended.
But though the Minnesota drafters recognized the problems of
common law mens rea that had led to the MPC’s proposed mens
rea reforms, Minnesota drafters did not buy the entire MPC
package. To be sure, the Minnesota Code displays hints of MPC
influence on mens rea, but Minnesota stopped far short of
adopting the bold new MPC framework. Perhaps the change
seemed too radical, especially given that no other state had yet
implemented the MPC’s approach to mens rea. The Minnesota
Criminal Code of 1963 thus contained some new mens rea
provisions reflecting more cautious, more incremental reforms.
First, the Minnesota drafters did attempt to adopt a more clear
mens rea vocabulary. Like the MPC drafters, the Minnesota
drafters recognized that the common law vocabulary was at times
rococo and confusing. So like the MPC drafters, the Minnesota
drafters created more straightforward definitions of common mens
rea terms. The Minnesota drafters defined the two basic terms
38
“intentionally” and “know,” and their definitions were similar to
the definitions of “purposefully” and “knowingly” used by the

35. Maynard E. Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47
MINN. L. REV. 417, 424 (1962) (“The ten year study devoted to the preparation of
the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute indicates recognition of the
need for improvement in the criminal codes of this country by a national
organization of judges and lawyers.”).
36. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.17 (2012), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01
(1962).
37. Pirsig, supra note 35, at 422.
38. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(2)–(3).
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39

MPC.
But the Minnesota drafters defined only those two terms—no
provisions suggested or defined other mens rea possibilities, such
as recklessness or negligence. Moreover, the Minnesota drafters
did not attempt to apply their defined menu across all crimes.
Several crimes retained archaic common law mens rea terminology.
For example, they retained a form of murder based on acts
40
“evincing a depraved mind,” and they retained a form of
41
manslaughter based on “culpable negligence.” Neither “depraved
mind” nor “culpable negligence” was defined anywhere in the
code. In sum, although the Minnesota drafters defined certain
mens rea terms, they did not follow the MPC in defining a fixed
menu of mens rea options applicable to all crimes.
Second, unlike the MPC, the Minnesota Code did not adopt
42
the elements approach to mens rea.
Unlike the MPC, the
Minnesota Code contained no recognition of the different types of
elements of an offense. Unlike the MPC, the Minnesota Code
contained no statement that a mens rea requirement could attach
to each element of an offense. In fact, certain statements suggested
43
a desire to maintain the common law “offense” approach. Nor
did the Minnesota Code make any effort to address the mistake-offact doctrine. The only mistake doctrine contained in the code is a
general statement of the hoary principle that ignorance of the law
44
is not a defense.
Third, the Minnesota drafters appeared to create an
interpretive default rule of strict liability. But the rule is less than
clear. Subdivision 9(1) of section 609.02 states: “When criminal
intent is an element of a crime in this chapter, such intent is
indicated by the term ‘intentionally,’ the phrase ‘with intent to,’
the phrase ‘with intent that,’ or some form of the verbs ‘know’ or
45
‘believe.’” The implication of that statement is that when no such
term is included in the definition of an offense, criminal intent is
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(b).
40. MINN. STAT. § 609.195(a).
41. Id. § 609.205(1).
42. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 688 & n.32 (identifying Minnesota
as one of the jurisdictions that continues to maintain the “offense analysis” of
mens rea, “under which each offense has one state of mind requirement”).
43. See § 609.02, subdiv. 9(1) (“When criminal intent is an element of a crime
in this chapter . . . .” (emphasis added)).
44. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(5) (“Criminal intent does not require proof of
knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute . . . .”).
45. Id.
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not an element of the offense. Thus, whereas the MPC adopted a
default rule of recklessness, the Minnesota Criminal Code
appeared to adopt a default rule of strict liability. But Minnesota’s
arguable default rule is stated in less clear terms than the MPC’s.
At most, it operates by negative implication.
Minnesota’s mens rea provisions show hints of MPC influence.
Both codes were enacted around the same time, and both were
responding to some of the same concerns. But Minnesota chose a
much more cautious path. It did not attempt to displace the
common law approach, and it did not attempt to create a single
robust mens rea framework that could solve mens rea problems
across a wide variety of criminal offenses. The MPC adopted a bold
new conceptual apparatus for the law of mens rea. Minnesota
adopted a more moderate amalgamated scheme that included
some modern reforms layered onto the old common law system.
III. PERSISTENT MENS REA PROBLEMS IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota’s cautious approach to mens rea reform in the 1963
Code has led to continuing problems in the criminal law. Many of
the same difficulties that afflicted the common law—indeed, the
same difficulties that animated the MPC reform efforts—linger in
Minnesota today.
A.

Terminology Problems

Minnesota retains confusing mens rea terminology in a variety
of areas. Minnesota continues to use a variety of mens rea terms—
the definitional mens rea provision in section 609.02 identifies only
two possibilities (knowledge and intent), but many criminal statutes
in Minnesota nonetheless use other mens rea terms. Some of those
statutory mens rea terms are vague and under-defined.
One of the clearest examples of that problem arises in
unintentional homicides. A defendant is generally guilty of
homicide if he intentionally kills another, but in certain
circumstances, a defendant may also be guilty for accidental,
unintentional killings. Aside from felony murder, there are two
general forms of unintentional homicide: culpable negligence
manslaughter and depraved-mind murder. An accidental killing
constitutes manslaughter if the defendant’s behavior demonstrates
“culpable negligence” where the defendant “creates an
unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death
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or great bodily harm to another.”
An accidental killing
constitutes murder if the defendant’s behavior “evinc[es] a
47
depraved mind, without regard for human life.”
The difference between murder and manslaughter for
accidental deaths is supposed to depend on the defendant’s mental
state, but it is hard to see any actual difference between the two
formulations. Imagine a defendant who casually fires a gun into an
ice fishing house, not knowing whether someone is inside. That
defendant consciously takes a chance of causing death or serious
injury to someone. But does he not also demonstrate a “depraved
mind” and show a disregard for human life? For that matter, is it
not the case that any time a defendant takes an unreasonable risk
that creates a risk of death or great bodily harm, he also shows that
he has a “depraved mind”? It is undoubtedly true that lines
between degrees of criminal offenses are sometimes necessarily
48
vague, but there should be lines nonetheless. In Minnesota, it is
hard to see any difference at all between culpable negligence
manslaughter and depraved-mind murder. The problem stems
from the code’s use of outmoded mens rea terminology.
Minnesota also retains the confusing and archaic distinction
49
between “specific intent” and “general intent” crimes.
That
distinction was ridiculed by critics in the early twentieth century
because it was used to mean so many disparate things. It was
abolished by the MPC. It may be that the drafters of Minnesota’s
1963 Code also intended to abolish it—the phrases “specific intent”
and “general intent” appear nowhere in the Minnesota Code. And
yet it has been retained by Minnesota courts, primarily for the
purpose of determining when the voluntary intoxication defense is
available.
Minnesota courts have used the terms themselves
inconsistently. In some early cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court
used the phrase “specific intent” simply to refer to whatever intent
was required by statute, such as the intent requirement for an
50
“intent to defraud” crime. In other cases, Minnesota courts used
46. Id. § 609.205(1).
47. Id. § 609.195(a).
48. At some point, vagueness in criminal statutes renders statutes
unconstitutional. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
49. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).
50. See State v. Higgin, 257 Minn. 46, 52, 99 N.W.2d 902, 907 (1959); see also
State v. Reps, 302 Minn. 38, 46–47, 223 N.W.2d 780, 786 (1974) (discussing
whether a contractor fraud statute contains any “specific intent” element); State v.
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“specific intent” to refer to the intent to commit some further
crime, such as the intent required in “assault with intent to commit
51
rape.” In recent years, however, courts have used “specific intent”
to mean something different. Now it apparently means the intent
to cause whatever harmful result is forbidden by a statute,
52
particularly an injury to another person. Minnesota courts have
never explained this oddly shifting definition.
Of course,
Minnesota is not alone in this difficulty:
Sometimes “general intent” is used in the same way as
“criminal intent” to mean the general notion of mens rea,
while “specific intent” is taken to mean the mental state
required for a particular crime. Or, “general intent” may
be used to encompass all forms of the mental state
requirement, while “specific intent” is limited to the one
mental state of intent. Another possibility is that “general
intent” will be used to characterize an intent to do
something on an undetermined occasion, and “specific
intent” to denote an intent to do that thing at a particular
53
time and place.
The difference is that, while many jurisdictions have retreated from
their old reliance on the distinction between specific and general
intent, Minnesota courts continue to employ it, apparently
undaunted by the obvious problems.
And definitional problems aside, Minnesota courts have also
Everson, 286 Minn. 246, 248, 175 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1970) (holding that the only
“specific intent” element required by a check fraud statute is the intent to
defraud); State v. O’Heron, 250 Minn. 83, 85, 83 N.W.2d 785, 786 (1957)
(discussing whether a crime of illegally taking waterfowl has any “specific intent”
element); State v. Armour & Co., 118 Minn. 128, 138, 136 N.W. 565, 569 (1912)
(discussing the requirement of clarity for strict liability statutes “where acts are
penalized without regard to specific intent”).
51. See State v. Johnson, 243 Minn. 296, 299 & n.4, 67 N.W.2d 639, 641–42 &
n.4 (1954); see, e.g., State v. Parker, 282 Minn. 343, 357, 164 N.W.2d 633, 642
(1969) (approving an instruction for accomplice liability stating that it requires
the “specific intent to do some act the law forbids”); State v. Edwards, 269 Minn.
343, 349, 130 N.W.2d 623, 627 (1964) (stating that a statute criminalizing
possession of burglary tools with intent to use them for a crime is a “specific
intent” statute); State v. Dumas, 118 Minn. 77, 84, 136 N.W. 311, 314 (1912)
(stating that Minnesota’s attempt statute requires the “specific intent” to commit a
crime).
52. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308–10; see, e.g., State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 656
(Minn. 2007) (“Specific intent means that the defendant acted with the intent to
produce a specific result . . . .”); State v. Cogger, 802 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2011) (same). But see State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788, 792–93 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2010) (noting different definitions of “specific intent”).
53. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (citation omitted).
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applied the terms inconsistently. After years of characterizing
54
assault as a specific-intent crime, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recently reversed course. As Teddie Gaitas and Emily Polachek
demonstrate, that reversal has the potential to produce a variety of
55
absurd (and presumably unintended) consequences.
Finally, the legislature has been hampered by the lack of
intermediate mens rea options. Section 609.02 suggests that
56
“intent” and “knowledge” are the only mens rea options available.
The choice between that and strict liability is an all-or-nothing
choice. But it makes sense in at least some circumstances to base
criminal liability on intermediate levels of culpability, such as
negligence or recklessness. Yet recklessness is essentially absent
from the Minnesota code. And in the cases where the legislature
has tried to create a negligence standard, it has generally done so
using a formulation such as “knew or should have known” or
“knowing or having reason to know.” In some of those instances,
Minnesota courts have simply failed to recognize the apparent
negligence standard—and have treated such standards as requiring
57
actual subjective knowledge.
B.

Filling In Statutory Gaps

Certain Minnesota statutes employ confusing mens rea terms.
But some statutes contain no mens rea terms at all. In such cases, it
is left to Minnesota courts to determine whether any mens rea
requirement applies, and if so, exactly what the mens rea standard
is and for which elements of the offense. Minnesota courts have
developed a large body of case law to answer these questions. That
case law, however, is hardly a model of consistency or wisdom.
As an initial matter, when a statute is silent as to mens rea,
courts must determine whether the crime is in fact a strict liability
offense or whether some mens rea requirement should be read
into the statute. As discussed above, subdivision 9 of section 609.02
appears to set a default rule of strict liability—that if a statute
includes no mens rea term, then no mens rea requirement is
54. Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 656–57; State v. Erdozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 722–23
(Minn. 1998); State v. Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Minn. 1981).
55. Theodora Gaïtas & Emily Polachek, State v. Fleck: The Intentional Infliction
of General Intent upon Minnesota’s Assault Statutes, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1480,
1496–1505 (2013).
56. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(2)–(3) (2012).
57. State v. Stevenson, 637 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
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58

intended. But in a departure from their usual “plain meaning”
approach, Minnesota courts occasionally ignore the legislatively
59
enacted default rule.
Two cases decided only months apart illustrate the difference.
State v. Loge involved a statute criminalizing possession of an open
60
bottle in an automobile. In re Welfare of C.R.M. involved a statute
61
criminalizing possession of a knife at school. In both cases, the
defendants claimed that they did not knowingly possess the
contraband; therefore, in both cases, the supreme court had to
determine whether any knowledge requirement applied. In Loge,
the court found no knowledge requirement based on the plain
62
meaning of the statute and the statutory structure. In C.R.M., by
contrast, the court read a knowledge requirement into the statute
63
because it was a felony and not a mere “public welfare” offense.
The rule of these cases appears to be that some mens rea
64
requirement will be read into felony (and gross misdemeanor)
offenses but not misdemeanor offenses. The justification for such a
rule, however, is questionable as a matter of statutory
interpretation. The Minnesota Supreme Court has often relied on
65
federal case law as support for its rule, but it is unclear why old
federal cases interpreting federal statutes have much bearing on
Minnesota statutes, especially in light of the subdivision 9 default.
The rule also creates problems when a single statute, such as the
order for protection statute, can produce both felony and
misdemeanor penalties depending on the circumstances.
Moreover, even assuming the rule is justified, it has not been
applied consistently. Felony DWI, for example, remains a strict
liability offense notwithstanding the stated rule of the case law that
66
felonies must have some mens rea element.
Second, once courts have determined that some mens rea
requirement applies, they must still determine what mens rea
requirement applies. That body of law is even more confusing.

58.
59.
default.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

§ 609.02, subdiv. 9(1).
In some cases, however, Minnesota courts have applied the strict liability
See State v. Skapyak, 702 N.W.2d 331, 333–34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
608 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 2000).
611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000).
Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 155–58.
C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 808–10.
State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 818–20 (Minn. 2012).
See, e.g., id. at 820.
State v. Smoot, 737 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court’s most important recent attempt to
answer this type of question came in State v. Al-Naseer, a case
67
involving vehicular homicide for leaving the scene of an accident.
The statute was silent as to mens rea, but the court quickly rejected
the possibility that it might actually be a strict liability offense. To
fill in the gap, the court considered five possible mens rea
68
standards. The very fact that five different standards are possible
under Minnesota case law shows how indeterminate that case law is.
69
The court ultimately chose one more-or-less sensible standard, but
the choice had much more to do with policy preference than with
the language of the statute itself. Once again, the case law in the
area does not follow ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, and
Minnesota courts have not set forth a uniform standard for
determining what mens rea standard applies.
Third, courts must also determine whether a statute has only
one mens rea requirement or whether there might be multiple
mens rea requirements attaching to various elements. Minnesota
courts generally assume, where a statute is silent, that it contains at
most one mens rea requirement. Put differently, Minnesota courts
have generally maintained the common law “offense approach” to
mens rea rather than the modern “elements approach.” One
implication of this approach is that Minnesota courts sometimes
assume that there must be some mens rea for the initial line of
criminal culpability but that strict liability applies to all aggravating
70
factors.
C.

Example from Drug Laws

Minnesota courts’ treatment of drug laws illustrates several of
these problems. Minnesota statutes make it a crime, for example,
to possess any amount of a Schedule I or II controlled substance in
71
a school zone. The statute is entirely silent as to mens rea. In the
1970s, in State v. Florine, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that all drug possession crimes have an implicit mens rea

67. 734 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2007).
68. Id. at 684.
69. Id. at 687–88.
70. See State v. Benniefield, 678 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 2004) (requiring the
state to prove defendant’s knowledge of the possession of an illegal substance but
not to prove any mens rea with regard to the location for conviction under a
possession in a school zone statute).
71. MINN. STAT. § 152.023, subdiv. 2(4) (2012).
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requirement—the defendant must have “actual knowledge of the
72
nature of the substance.” The court’s conclusion was not based
on the statute’s plain meaning, or the legislative history, or any
interpretive canons, or any case law rule that serious crimes must
have some mens rea. Rather, the court simply cited a general
73
criminal law treatise and considered the matter settled.
The phrase “nature of the substance” is not without its own
problems. It is not clear, under Florine, whether a defendant must
know exactly what drug he possessed or merely that a defendant
must know that he possessed some illegal substance. Thus the
Minnesota Court of Appeals struggled to apply the Florine
requirement where a defendant knew he possessed khat but
claimed not to know that khat contains cathinone, a controlled
74
substance. It is even more difficult to apply Florine’s “nature of the
substance” standard to drug mixtures, especially now that the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that accidental drug combinations,
such as bong water, constitute “mixtures” for the purposes of the
75
drug statutes.
In short, the supreme court read a mens rea
requirement into the statute with very little analysis, but the
requirement it chose is indeterminate and thus continues to
produce litigation today.
Florine addressed the baseline mens rea element regarding the
drug itself. Three decades later, in State v. Benniefield, the court was
faced with the question of whether there was an additional mens
76
rea requirement for the school-zone element. In Benniefield, the
defendant claimed that he had only accidentally wandered into a
77
school zone.
The court held, however, that the school zone
element is a strict-liability element because one mens rea
requirement is enough: “Having established that mens rea is an
72. State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975).
73. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 25
(1972)).
74. State v. Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Our supreme
court has not had occasion to clarify whether Minnesota’s actual-knowledge
requirement may be satisfied by proof that the defendant knew that the substance
he possessed was illegal.”).
75. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 773 (2009). Peck has been partially, but
only partially, overruled by subsequent statutory amendment. See § 152.022,
subdiv. 2(b) (“For the purposes of this subdivision, the weight of fluid used in a
water pipe may not be considered in measuring the weight of a mixture except in
cases where the mixture contains four or more fluid ounces of fluid.”).
76. 678 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2004).
77. Id. at 45.
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implied element in the statute with respect to possession, we see no
basis for requiring the state to demonstrate an additional mens rea
78
element with respect to location.” Once again, it is hard to see
how that rationale is justified in terms of ordinary principles of
statutory interpretation.
It is similarly doubtful whether the court’s “one mens rea
element is enough” rationale makes sense as a policy matter. To
see why, consider three hypothetical defendants, all of whom
possessed a small amount of marijuana. Defendant A walked down
one street, 600 feet from a school. Defendant B walked down a
different street and unwittingly came within 400 feet of a school.
Defendant C went looking for a school, in hopes of finding a young
user to share his drugs. Defendant C is more culpable than
Defendant A or Defendant B, and yet the Minnesota courts’
approach to mens rea treats Defendant B as equivalently culpable
to Defendant C. Because proximity to a school is a strict-liability
element, Defendant B is punished much more severely based on
pure happenstance. To be sure, there are colorable policy reasons
for imposing strict liability based on proximity to a school. The
point is simply that the criminal statutes themselves give no
indication that the legislature made a choice to impose strict
liability—it has simply been imposed, almost blithely, by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, just as it almost blithely created a mens
rea requirement for the “nature of the substance” decades ago.
The examples from Minnesota’s drug laws illustrate the larger
point about Minnesota’s approach to mens rea. Lacking clear
guidance from criminal statutes themselves, Minnesota courts
struggle to determine whether statutes have mens rea
requirements, and if so, what they are. But the mens rea doctrine
developed by Minnesota courts is hardly a model of consistency. In
sum, despite the efforts of Pirsig and the 1963 reformers to
rationalize Minnesota’s mens rea law, it remains as confusing as
ever.
IV. PROPOSALS
Another major reform and recodification effort is unlikely for
the foreseeable future. It would be difficult, politically and
otherwise, to try to integrate the entire MPC framework into the
Minnesota Criminal Code. But a few smaller reforms, borrowed
78.

Id. at 48.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 2

1474

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

from the MPC, could lead to a more coherent mens rea doctrine in
Minnesota over time.
A.

Proposal #1—Adding to the Mens Rea Menu

As a starting point, Minnesota should add to its menu of mens
rea options. Rather than a binary choice between intent or
knowledge on one hand and strict liability on the other, the code
should make intermediate options available. It makes sense to
simply borrow the definitions of recklessness and negligence from
the MPC. Thus, the mens rea definitions provision of section
609.02 should be amended. That provision currently reads:
Subd. 9. Mental state.
(1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in this
chapter, such intent is indicated by the term
“intentionally,” the phrase “with intent to,” the phrase
“with intent that,” or some form of the verbs “know” or
“believe.”
(2) “Know” requires only that the actor believes that the
specified fact exists.
(3) “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or
believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful,
will cause that result. In addition, except as provided in
clause (6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts
which are necessary to make the actor’s conduct criminal
and which are set forth after the word “intentionally.”
(4) “With intent to” or “with intent that” means that the
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the
result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will
cause that result.
(5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge
of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under
which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of
the terms used in that statute.
(6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge
of the age of a minor even though age is a material
79
element in the crime in question.
It should be amended to read as follows:
Subd. 9. Mental state.
(1) The legislature may use any of the following terms, or
79.

§ 609.02, subdiv. 9.
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variants thereof, to indicate that some mental state is an
element of an offense under this chapter.
(2) “Intentionally” or “with intent to” or “with intent that”
means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing
or cause the result specified or believes that the act
performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that result.
In addition, except as provided in clause (8), the actor
must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to
make the actor’s conduct criminal and which are set forth
after the word “intentionally.”
(3) “Knowingly” or “know” requires only that the actor
believes that the specified fact exists.
(4) “Recklessly” requires that the actor consciously
disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his
conduct will do the thing or cause the result specified, or
that the specified attendant circumstance exists.
(5) “Negligently” requires that the actor should be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will
do the thing or cause the result specified, or that the
specified attendant circumstance exists.
(6) When the law provides that negligence suffices to
establish an element of an offense, such element also is
established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an
element, such element also is established if a person acts
intentionally or knowingly.
When acting knowingly
suffices to establish an element, such element also is
established if a person acts intentionally.
(7) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge
of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under
which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of
the terms used in that statute.
(8) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge
of the age of a minor even though age is a material
element in the crime in question.
These changes should be uncontroversial. The definitions of
“intentionally” and “knowingly” remain the same. The only
technical change suggested is that the current clauses (3) and (4),
for definitions of “intentionally” and “with intent that,” be
combined since they are substantially redundant. The amendment
would then add definitions of “recklessly” and “negligently,”
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80

borrowed from the MPC. Also borrowed from the MPC is the
technical hierarchy provision—that negligence is the lowest level
and that if a statute specifies a negligence mens rea, a defendant is
81
also guilty if he acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
By themselves, these changes would not affect any current
crimes. As a result, by themselves, these changes would not affect
the criminal law in Minnesota one iota. What they would do,
however, would be to give the legislature additional options when
drafting offenses in the future. The legislature would never be
required to choose recklessness or negligence as a mens rea standard
for a criminal offense, but it could do so. For at least some
offenses, such standards could be appropriate. For example,
various forms of assault could be rewritten to require recklessness
rather than intent. After all, if a defendant engages in highly risky
behavior that causes injury to another, arguably he should be guilty
of some offense (just as a defendant who engages in highly risky
behavior causing death is guilty of some form of homicide).
But regardless of whether recklessness or negligence makes
sense for any particular offense, the point is simply that having
additional clearly defined options would make it easier for the
legislature to draft clear criminal laws in the future.
B.

Proposal #2—New Default for Future Crimes

The MPC has a clear default rule; Minnesota has none. For
reasons described above, our lack of clear default has created
unnecessary confusion in the case law. To the extent that clause
(1) of section 609.02, subdivision 9, was intended as a strict liability
default, it has been, at least sometimes, ignored by the courts. It
would be helpful to have a clearer default rule for future crimes.
Once again, the MPC can serve as a model. Section 609.02 should
be amended to add a new subdivision with a recklessness default:
Subd. 9a. Default mental state.
For all new offenses enacted after July 31, 2013, if the
mental state required to establish any material element of
an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is
established if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or
recklessly with respect thereto.

80.
81.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)–(d) (1962).
Id. § 2.02(5).
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The proposed default rule would apply only to newly enacted
offenses.
It would be logistically difficult and politically
controversial to apply the default rule to existing offenses. And in
any event, for most existing offenses, the mens rea requirements
have already been settled by case law or otherwise. Consequently,
the default rule, by itself, would not affect any current crimes.
Moreover, the default rule would not necessarily affect any
future crimes. The default rule would not require recklessness for
any offense. Rather, it would simply state that in cases where the
legislature fails to specify a mens rea requirement for an element of
an offense, recklessness (or above) fills in as a default. The
legislature would always retain the power to choose a different
mens rea standard—intent, knowledge, negligence, or strict
liability. In short, the default rule would not counsel any mens rea
for any offense. Rather, it would only function in instances of
legislative inattention.
The rule would nonetheless be valuable for both the
legislature and Minnesota courts. For the legislature, it would serve
as a backdrop mens rea—and it could function as a helpful
reminder that whenever the legislature chooses to enact a new
crime, it should carefully consider and specify the appropriate
mens rea level for each element of the offense. The legislature is
perfectly capable of specifying mens rea. It has, for example,
clearly specified that there is no mens rea required for the element
82
of age in most statutory rape offenses. It should do the same for
all offenses. A default rule could prod the legislature to be more
clear in the future. That would, in turn, benefit courts. A clear
default rule would lead to more predictable results and less
litigation. Minnesota’s confusing doctrine about whether and how
to fill in a mens rea standard could be allowed to fade into history.
C.

Proposal #3—Adopt the Elements Approach to Mens Rea

The proposed amendment, subdivision 9a above, would also
adopt the elements approach to mens rea. In other words, it would
clarify that the default recklessness applies to each element of the
offense, not simply to the offense as a whole. Again, that would not
by itself require that the legislature enact multiple mens rea
requirements for an offense. The legislature would always have the
82. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(a) (“Neither mistake as to the
complainant’s age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense . . . .”).
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ability to specify a mens rea standard for one element but not
another. Rather, the default rule would only serve to clarify that
each element can have a mens rea and that when no mens rea is
specified, courts should fill in recklessness.
Some will object that having multiple mens rea requirements
for a single offense will lead to confusion. But it is already true that
some offenses in Minnesota have multiple mens rea requirements.
For example, even the simple crime of theft has at least three
83
different mens rea requirements. Juries in theft cases are already
instructed that they must find three different mens rea facts to be
84
true beyond a reasonable doubt. Those requirements have not
caused substantial problems, nor have they made it impossible for
prosecutors to prove theft. Nor is it the case that the elements
approach has caused major problems in jurisdictions that have
adopted the MPC mens rea framework.
Once again, the point of the reform is not to take a policy
position that any particular crime should have multiple mens rea
requirements. The purpose is simply to work toward a system
where legislators will indicate mens rea requirements more clearly,
and courts will have a more sensible system for handling
interpretive disputes when the legislature fails to speak clearly.
Adoption of the elements analysis would help to “provide fair
notice of the scope of the prohibition, eliminate the need for
judicial construction that may expand or reduce that scope, and
delineate the scope so as to limit the arbitrary administration and
85
application of criminal laws.”
V. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, it might have been better if the Minnesota
Criminal Code of 1963 had adopted the MPC mens rea framework
to a greater extent. Maynard Pirsig, the Minnesota Code’s chief
drafter, noted that then-existing statutes and doctrine had resulted
in “much confusion and uncertainty as to what mental state is
86
intended.” But Pirsig’s attempted revisions did not go far enough,
and as a result, confusion and uncertainty persist fifty years later.
A few small reforms, however, could alleviate many of those
83.
84.

See id. § 609.52, subdiv. 2(a).
See 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTIONS
GUIDE—CRIMINAL § 16.02 (5th ed. 2006).
85. Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 703–04 (citations omitted).
86. Pirsig, supra note 35, at 422.
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problems. By inching toward an MPC mens rea framework, at least
for newly enacted offenses, Minnesota could produce a more
sensible criminal law. The sort of vast, code-wide reforms pursued
by Wechsler and Pirsig may be a thing of the past, but incremental
improvements in the criminal code are still possible.
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